[1]谭瑾,徐光伟.地区腐败与企业战略导向:可持续发展还是短期利益攫取?[J].常州大学学报(社会科学版),2022,23(01):64-75.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2022.01.008]
　Tan Jin,Xu Guangwei.Regional Corruption and Strategic Orientation of Enterprises:Sustainable Development or Short Term Profit Grabbing?[J].Journal of Changzhou University(Social Science Edition),2022,23(01):64-75.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2022.01.008]
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地区腐败与企业战略导向:可持续发展还是短期利益攫取?()
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常州大学学报(社会科学版)[ISSN:2095-042X/CN:32-1821/C]

卷:
第23卷
期数:
2022年01期
页码:
64-75
栏目:
经济·管理学研究
出版日期:
2022-01-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
Regional Corruption and Strategic Orientation of Enterprises:Sustainable Development or Short Term Profit Grabbing?
作者:
谭瑾; 徐光伟
Author(s):
Tan Jin;  Xu Guangwei
关键词:
地区腐败;  政企合谋;  创新战略导向;  关系战略导向
Keywords:
regional corruption;  collusion between government and enterprises;  innovation strategic orientation;  relationship strategic orientation
分类号:
F275
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2022.01.008
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
政商生态环境是影响企业战略选择的重要因素。基于政企合谋角度探讨了地区腐败对企业战略导向选择的影响效应及机理。研究结果表明,地区腐败与企业创新战略导向之间显著负相关,与企业关系战略导向之间显著正相关。地区腐败对创新战略导向的抑制效应在民营企业中表现更突出,对关系战略导向的刺激作用则在国有企业中表现更明显。研究从微观企业层面拓展了对腐败经济后果的理论认知,从制度层面深化了对转型期我国企业战略决策内在特殊逻辑的理解。
Abstract:
The ecological environment of government and enterprises is an important factor affecting the strategic choice of enterprises. Based on the perspective of collusion between government and enterprises, this paper discusses the effects and mechanism of regional corruption on the choice of enterprise strategic orientation. The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between regional corruption and enterprise innovation strategic orientation, and a significant positive correlation between regional corruption and enterprise relationship strategic orientation. The inhibition effect of regional corruption on innovation strategic orientation is more prominent in private enterprises, while its stimulation effect on relationship strategic orientation is more obvious in state-owned enterprises. The study expands the theoretical understanding of the economic consequences of corruption from the micro enterprise level, and also deepens the understanding of the internal special logic of Chinese enterprise strategic decision-making in the transition period from the institutional level.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介:谭瑾,管理学博士,常州大学商学院讲师; 徐光伟,管理学博士,常州大学商学院副教授。
基金项目:江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目“高质量发展背景下江苏制造业企业金融化多维测度、影响机制与政策应对”(2020SJA1212); 国家自然科学基金青年项目“区域一体化与企业异地投资:空间偏好、进入模式与经济后果”(72103026)。
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01