[1]史普润,曹佳颖,贾军.后进平台竞争策略研究:理论分析与案例验证[J].常州大学学报(社会科学版),2022,23(01):57-63.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2022.01.007]
　Shi Purun,Cao Jiaying,Jia Jun.On Competitive Strategies of Latecomer Platforms: Theoretical Analysis and Case Verification[J].Journal of Changzhou University(Social Science Edition),2022,23(01):57-63.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2022.01.007]
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后进平台竞争策略研究:理论分析与案例验证()
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常州大学学报(社会科学版)[ISSN:2095-042X/CN:32-1821/C]

卷:
第23卷
期数:
2022年01期
页码:
57-63
栏目:
经济·管理学研究
出版日期:
2022-01-31

文章信息/Info

Title:
On Competitive Strategies of Latecomer Platforms: Theoretical Analysis and Case Verification
作者:
史普润; 曹佳颖; 贾军
Author(s):
Shi Purun;  Cao Jiaying;  Jia Jun
关键词:
后进平台;  “赢家通吃”;  移动支付平台;  竞争策略
Keywords:
latecomer platforms;  “Winner Takes All”;  mobile payment platform;  competitive strategy
分类号:
F062.5
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2022.01.007
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
移动支付市场中“赢家通吃”的特性使得后进平台难以对在位平台构成威胁,但是后进平台却未必总在赶超中失败。以后进平台为研究视角,从消费者用户和商户用户两个角度分析了后进平台的竞争策略,得出如下结论:拥有资金优势应的后进平台应当选择商户用户市场采用价格竞争策略与在位平台竞争; 资金缺乏但具有较高的技术创新水平的后进平台应当选择消费者用户市场采取效用补贴策略与在位平台竞争。
Abstract:
“Winner takes all” makes it difficult for latecomer platforms to pose a threat to existing platforms, but latecomer platforms may not always fail in catching up. From the perspective of latecomer platforms, this paper analyzes the competitive strategies of latecomer platforms from the viewpoints of consumer users and merchant users, and draws the following conclusions: latecomer platforms with capital advantage should choose the market of merchant users and adopt the strategy of price competition to compete with existing platforms; latecomer platforms lacking in funds but with high innovation level should choose the market of consumer users and take the strategy of utility subsidy to compete with existing platforms.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介:史普润,管理学博士,南京审计大学商学院讲师; 曹佳颖,南京审计大学硕士研究生; 贾军,管理学博士,济南大学商学院副教授。
基金项目:江苏省社会科学基金一般项目“基于非价格竞争视角的平台型企业反垄断执法范式和政策优化研究”(21FXD005); 国家社会科学基金一般项目“人工智能对就业的影响机制与对策研究”(20BJL144)。
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01