[1]赵 刚,沈佳敏.CFO担任董事会抑制股价崩盘风险吗?——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].常州大学学报(社会科学版),2018,19(04):71-79.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2018.04.008]
　Zhao Gang,Shen Jiamin.Can Stock Price Smash Risk Be Curbed by CFO Being a Member of the Board of Directors?—Empirical Evidence of Chinese Capital Market[J].Journal of Changzhou University(Social Science Edition),2018,19(04):71-79.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2018.04.008]
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CFO担任董事会抑制股价崩盘风险吗?——来自中国资本市场的经验证据()
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常州大学学报(社会科学版)[ISSN:2095-042X/CN:32-1821/C]

卷:
第19卷
期数:
2018年04期
页码:
71-79
栏目:
经济·管理学研究
出版日期:
2018-07-28

文章信息/Info

Title:
Can Stock Price Smash Risk Be Curbed by CFO Being a Member of the Board of Directors?—Empirical Evidence of Chinese Capital Market
作者:
赵 刚; 沈佳敏
Author(s):
Zhao Gang;  Shen Jiamin
关键词:
董事;  CFO;  股价崩盘;  企业价值
Keywords:
members of the board of directors;  CFO;  stock price smash;  enterprise value
分类号:
F275.5
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2018.04.008
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
基于2007—2015年间中国上市公司样本,探究CFO担任董事对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现:(1)CFO担任董事能够显著降低股价崩盘风险,对民营企业更为突出;(2)CFO进入董事会能够提高企业的未来价值,对国有企业更为明显。研究为CFO担任董事与股价崩盘风险之间的内在关系提供了经验证据,为CFO制度发展、完善公司治理结构和防范股价崩盘风险提供了新思路。
Abstract:
Taking Chinese listed companies between 2007 and 2015 as research samples, the influence of CFO being a member of the board of directors on curbing stock price smash risk is studied. It demonstrates that, firstly, CFO being a member of the board of directors can significantly curb the stock price smash risk, especially for private enterprises; secondly, this practice can enhance the future value of enterprises, especially for state-owned enterprises. The study provides empirical evidence for the internal relationship between CFO as a member of the board of directors and the stock price smash risk and a new perspective of CFO system development, corporate governing structure improvement and stock price smash risk prevention.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介:赵刚,会计学博士,浙江财经大学会计学院副教授,常州大学商学院硕士生导师; 沈佳敏,常州大学商学院硕士研究生。
基金项目:国家哲学社会科学基金一般项目 “基于微观企业会计信息预测宏观经济增长的研究”(16BJY018)。
更新日期/Last Update: 2018-07-28