[1]王文华,陈玉荣,夏丹丹.大股东控制、高管持股与研发投资强度关系研究
——— 基于高新技术上市公司的实证研究[J].常州大学学报(社会科学版),2013,14(03):36-40.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2013.03.010]
,Research on the Relationship among the Major Stockholder Controlling,
Executive Stockholding and R&D Intensity———Empirical Research
Based on Listed Companies of High and New Technology[J].Journal of Changzhou University(Social Science Edition),2013,14(03):36-40.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2013.03.010]
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大股东控制、高管持股与研发投资强度关系研究
——— 基于高新技术上市公司的实证研究(
)
常州大学学报(社会科学版)[ISSN:2095-042X/CN:32-1821/C]
- 卷:
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第14卷
- 期数:
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2013年03期
- 页码:
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36-40
- 栏目:
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管理学研究
- 出版日期:
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2013-05-25
文章信息/Info
- Title:
-
Research on the Relationship among the Major Stockholder Controlling,
Executive Stockholding and R&D Intensity———Empirical Research
Based on Listed Companies of High and New Technology
- 作者:
-
王文华; 陈玉荣; 夏丹丹
-
常州大学经济管理学院,江苏常州213164
- Author(s):
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WANG Wen-hua; CHEN Yu-rong; XIA Dan-dan
-
(School of Economics and Management,Changzhou University,Changzhou 213164,China)
-
- 关键词:
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大股东控制; 高管持股; 研发投资强度
- Keywords:
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Major Stockholder Controlling; Executive Stockholding; R&D Investment
- 分类号:
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F830.91
- DOI:
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10.3969/j.issn.2095-042X.2013.03.010
- 文献标志码:
-
A
- 摘要:
-
运用高新技术上市公司2006-2010年面板数据,实证研究了大股东控制、高管持股与研发投资强度的关系。公司研发投
资强度与高管持股显著正相关;国有性质上市公司显著负向调节公司研发投资强度与高管持股之间关系;第一大股东持股比例显
著负向调节公司研发投资强度与高管持股之间关系。因此,我国国有上市公司实施高管股权激励方案应该考虑大股东控制的影
响。
- Abstract:
-
The paper is an empirical research on relationship among the Major Shareholder Controlling,
Executive Shareholding and R&D Intensity based on panel data of listed companies of high and new
technology from 2006to 2010.The relationship between R&D intensity and the shareholding ratio of
executives is positive correlation.State-owned listed companies have significantly negative effect on the
relationship between R&D intensity of companies and the shareholding ratio of executives.The
shareholding ratio of the first major stockholder has significant effect on the relationship between R&D
intensity of companies and the shareholding ratio of executives.So,we should take into consideration of
impact of controlling of big-shareholder when we implement the incentive scheme of executives stock
right in state-owned listed companies
参考文献/References:
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备注/Memo
- 备注/Memo:
-
作者简介:王文华(1975—),男,湖北黄冈人,博士研究生,副教授,主要从事公司治理与研发投资研究。
陈玉荣(1964—),四川遂宁人,博士,教授,主要从事会计与财务管理研究。
基金项目:国家社科基金项目(12BGL104);常州大学青年发展基金项目(11sk0703)
更新日期/Last Update:
2013-05-25