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常州大学学报(社会科学版)[ISSN:2095-042X/CN:32-1821/C]

卷:

第11卷

期数:

2010年03期

页码:

5-9

栏目:

哲学研究

出版日期:

2010-09-25

文章信息/Info

Title:

Wisdom of Transcending Knowledge 　　　——Analysis of Zhuangzi's " Pure Knowledge"

作者:

肖云恩

北京师范大学哲学与社会学学院, 北京100875

Author(s):

XIAO Yun- en

College o f Philoso phy and Sociolog y, Beijing No rmal Univ ersity, Beijing 100875, China

关键词:

庄子;  真知;  本真之道;  忘知之知

Keywords:

Zhuangzi;  t rue know ledg e;  real " dao ";  wisdom of t ranscending knowledge

分类号:

B223. 5

文献标志码:

A

摘要:

哲学上关于“真”或真实问题的讨论, 一般都归属于知识论的范畴。尽管先秦时期的庄子对认知意义上的“知”是持怀 疑和否定的态度, 但我们却不能因此就认为, 庄子哲学里完全没有关于“真知”的思想, 只不过庄子所主张的“真知”并非西方 认知意义上的“知”, 而是一种“忘知之知”的大智慧。在庄子看来, 人们若只站在各自有限的角度, 把自然万物当成和自我主 体相对立的客体来进行区别, 而不顾及对象事物本身周流不息的自然情状, 那么所形成的观点就只能是有限的。故他认为只有从 “道”的角度来对对象世界进行观照, 即“以道

Abstract:

T he discussion of "True" or t ruth in philosophy is generally att ributed to the ar ea of knowledge. Zhuangzi, the great thinker in Pre- Qin Dynasty in China, was skept ical to the cognitiv e sense of " know ing" w ith negat ive att itude. It do es not follow that there is no tho ug ht of " t rue knowledge" at all in his philosophy . T he " t rue know ledg e" Zhuangzi adv ocated is not like a w ester n cognitiv e sense of " know ing " , but a gr eat w isdom of abandoning know ledg e. In his opinion, if peo ple stand on their ow n limited point of view , then the view they formed can o nly be limited. Because they take the natural w orld as the o pposed object regardless of their natural characters by the nature's endless stream of pow er . T hat is w hy he believ es that human beings can only ref lect on the object in the w or ld by the principle of the " Dao " to gain w isdom o f t ranscending know ledge.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:

作者简介: 肖云恩( 1978—) , 男, 浙江温州人, 博士研究生, 主要从事艺术理论研究。

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更新日期/Last Update: 2010-09-25